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Department of Organization of the Central-South China Bureau. 665

After the Constitution was promulgated, all government personnel offices of the central and provincial governments were disbanded. This may mean even firmer Party control of personnel policy.

3. The Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control

One of the most common and effective instruments of Party control over government is the Office of Supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. It is found at all levels from the central government down to the county government. This system of control should be distinguished from the judicial agencies of control, namely, the people's procuratorates, and from the public security agencies.[36] Supervisory offices of all levels and in all organizations are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, heads of these offices are either Party secretaries or chiefs of public security agencies. Personnel working in these offices are usually activists, who, like the members of the Party, only carry out Party directives. 665 647

The offices of supervision check the execution of government policies directed against officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption. Unlike the people's procuratorates, they check only

36. Discussions of judicial and public-security organs will be found in later studies.

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government employees.[37]

The highest supervisory agency in the Central-South Region before 1954 was the Central-South People's Control Commission established in March 1950. Similar offices were organized in the several provinces and in administrative districts in 1950 and 1951.[38]

Control branches have been established in state enterprises,[39] financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably railways,[40] and post offices. At the provincial level, such offices are formed within each department and bureau dealing with financial and economic matters. From two to four workers are employed in each branch.

The work of the supervisory offices in the region is co-ordinated with the major yearly drives. The tasks for the nation[41] in 1955 are the elimination of nation-wide waste, corruption, and degeneration within the government.

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37. T'an Cheng-wen's article in "Chien-ch'üan Jen min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih", ["Construct a Peoples' Protectorate and Reinforce State Judicial System"], New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

38. Summary Reports of the Central-South China Peoples' Control Committee in Yangtze Daily, Sept., 20, 1950, p. 2; August 8, 1951, p. 5; Dec. 5, 1942, p. 1.

39. Directive governing establishment, People's Daily, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

40. Directive governing the establishment, ibid., Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

41. Official report on the Conference Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 3.

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People's supervision reporters[42] are sent out by the supervisory commission or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working groups to spy on the individual worker for evidences of misdemeanor, waste, corruption, bureaucracy, and other behavior not in the "best interest" of the State. Their techniques are varied. They may make direct accusations, establish a network of mass contact, spy on their own colleagues, tamper with the people's complaint boxes, or control the hearings of the "reception room." The complaint boxes are used to encourage accusations and complaints aginst officials and agencies. This arrangement is required in all government offices, and the head of the office is responsible for the examination of these letters, and appropriate replies. The reception room enables people to make accusations and complaints directly to the government. The reception room of the People's Control Commission under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee received 1,615 people and undertook 2,349 cases in a period of six months in 1952.[44] With the subsequent recession of large-scale drives, the number of complaints has doubtless declined.

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42. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, Yangtze Daily, Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

43. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, ibid., Aug. 26, 1953, p. 1.

44. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

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The Chinese Communists, through their pyramiding units of regional and local governments, have developed a structure of controls which places a near monopoly of local as well as national power in the hands of a small group of senior leaders. Specifically, by means of its bureaus, the Communist Party has achieved a combination of decentralization of administrative responsibility on local levels with centralized control from Peking. Between top administrative positions in central government and regional units, in fact, there is a notable overlapping of personnel. Our analysis is concerned with the pattern of this overlapping and with the actual administrative roles of the men who constitute the official leadership in Central-South China.

We have studied the positions of seventy-nine men whose posts, on a regional level, include that of governor, chairman, and member of Provincial People's Governments; commander of provincial and regional military districts; president of provincial People's High Courts; regional committee member of the New Democratic Youth Corps; and delegate from the Central-South China area to the First National People's Congress (NPC).

These seventy-nine men hold a total of 204 administrative, military or political positions on both national and regional levels. This is an

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average of 2.5 functions each. To a certain extent, this concentration of administrative function might be explained by a shortage of trained personnel, but the average is misleading when an analysis is made of the nature and number of the positions held by individuals on different levels of authority.

Twenty-two men held only one known position: seventeen deputy-governors, two New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) officials, two presidents of People's High Courts, and one vice-chairman of a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Chinese People's P.C.C.) Provincial Committee. The remaining fifty-seven men, therefore, average over three jobs each.

Further breakdown, however, reveals that twenty-two of these men hold two jobs each; these are almost equally divided between men whose positions are on a regional level and those who have one regional job and whose other function is as delegate to the First National People's Congress (NPC).

The remaining thirty-five men average slightly under four positions each. These include all of the important national positions -- membership on the National Defence Council, the State Council, the Standing Committee of the First NPC and the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. -- that are noted among the 204 positions held by the group as a whole .

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COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS

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These thirty-five key men can be divided into three categories: twenty-four Communist Party officials, six former Kuomintang men who joined the Communists in 1949, and five officials who do not, on the surface, appear to fit any single classification except that of performing three or more functions simultaneously.

We find, among the twenty-four Communists, thirteen members of the Central Committee, six members of Provincial Committees, and five whose exact Party status at present is not known. We can learn something about the road to senior leadership by looking at the careers of these men to see what patterns, if any, are common to their rise to power.

Five of these men are veteran Communist leaders: Fang Fang, Feng Po-chü, Shao Shih-p'ing, Chang Yün-i, and Ku Ta-ts'un. All five have long records of tough preparation for their present jobs. Their careers present an impressive montage of underground activity, guerrilla warfare and participation in revolutionary uprisings. Long before achieving high office they have proved their competence, party loyalty, and dependability.

Three of these men -- Fang Fang, Feng Po-chü, and Shao Shih-p'ing -- have been politically active since the early 1920s; they all took part in student demonstrations (the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Party cell activities at the Ta-hsia University in

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Shanghai, and the March 31st Demonstration in 1926). After 1927, and until joining the Border Region governments, all three continued with Party organizational and guerrilla activities. Chang Yün-i took part in the Nanchang Uprising and then continued his military career with Communist forces; from 1937 on, he served in the New 4th Army. The fifth man, Ku Ta-ts'un, began in 1924 as a peasant leader in eastern Kwangtung, and has been a leader of Communist activities in his province ever since.

In addition to these five veterans, we find seven men whose Communist records are known to us since the period of the Border Region governments. Wu Chih-p'u and Chang Chih-i were directors of the department of political affairs attached to the New 4th Army; T'an Cheng was political commissar of the Reserve Command of the 18th Group Army; Liu Tzu-hou, Wang Jen-chung, and Hsing Chao-t'ang were administrators in Border Region governments; and Chao I-min was president of Yenan University.

Although there are no data before 1949 on the others, a significant Communist record can be assumed on the basis of their earliest known status. In 1949 we find, among these men, seven members of the Central Committee of the CPC, four Party Provincial Committee members who were at the same time vice-chairmen or members of Provincial People's governments, and one who was both vice-political commissar of a provincial military district and chairman of a military control committee.

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On the basis of these facts, we can make certain generalizations about what the qualifications for senior leadership appear to be. All of the known veteran Communists occupy senior positions, but as there are only five such men among the entire seventy-nine, the need for a wider distribution of the important administrative functions becomes apparent. Even if the known Border Region men are added, the percentage of long-tested Communists is only 15.2 per cent of the seventy-nine men now performing the administrative leadership of the region.

We find, furthermore, that service dating from the Border Region days does not, by itself, guarantee top-level power at present. In addition to the seven noted above, we have data on two other men -- Wen Min-sheng and Chia Hsin-chai -- who have participated in Communist administration since the Border Region period but who do not now appear to have key senior status. Both are deputy-governors; Chia Hsin-chai is also a delegate to the First NPC and Wen Min-sheng is known to have been former chairnan of a local Party committee. Neither is known to hold any other significant posts. We find also that of the seven former Border Region men who hold more positions numerically, only two hold important national positions: Chao I-min is a Natio nal Committee member of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and T'an Cheng is a member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC and of the National Defence Council. The others hold no key national positions.

We must look, therefore, at the more recent careers of the senior Communist leaders to see if

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there is any career-pattern which tends to lead to top authority. The largest number of officials have risen to power through administrative or executive specializations; second in number are the military administrators. 647

In detail, we find certain posts which have been held by a significant percentage of the group: chairman of provincial governments (8); vice-chairmen of provincial governments (7); delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. (6); political commissar (5); directors, department of political affairs (4); and member, military control committee (4). We might assume, then, that men now in these positions, or their equivalents, are considered directly in line for future top posts.

An analysis of the present positions held by the top Communist officials reveals much about the techniques for control which have been developed by Communist administrators. The twenty-four men under study hold a total of seventy-five extra-Party positions. When the Party posts are added to this figure, the total becomes ninety-nine, or just under half of the 204 positions originally noted. 647 665

These figures become more meaningful when we determine the percentage of top-level posts, on both a national and regional level, which are filled by Party officials. Seventeen out of eighteen key regional jobs (governor and chairman of provincial governments, Chinese People's P.C.C. Provincial Committee member, and commander of military districts) are Party-held, as are nineteen

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out of twenty-nine top national posts (member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC National Defense Council member, deputy premier and member of the State Council, and National Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C.) This means that 65 per cent of the key positions on national and regional levels are held by Party officials. 647 665

Superficially, one is impressed by the interrelationship of political and military leadership, with important military men serving also as Party leaders and holding dominant positions in the political administration. But closer scrutiny of the constellation of key incumbencies reveals clearly that the government is, in fact, dominated by the Party and not by military command. The really important military men are Party leaders first and use their military power as an adjunct to Party function.

The provincial distribution of positions among the Communist Party men insures both central and Party authority in sensitive spots throughout the local administrative structure. The four known governors (the governor of Hunan Province is not included among the seventy-nine men under study) are trusted Party men: T'ao Chu of Kwangtung, Shao Shih-p'ing of Kiangsi, Wu Chih-p'u of Honan and Liu Tzu-hou of Hupeh. Communist deputy-governors are also found in five provinces: four in Kwangtung, two in Hunan, and one each in Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Honan provinces. Although there is no known Party official among the deputy-governors in Kwangsi, we find members of the Kwangsi Provincial Committee

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of the Party in four other positions: a member of the Provincial People's Government, the commander of the Kwangsi Province Air Defense Command, a Kwangsi Provincial Committee member of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and the commander of the Kwangsi Provincial Military District. Members of the Provincial Committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Hunan provinces are ranking Party men, as are officials in the military district commands in Kwangtung and Hupeh. This means that there are at least two, and as many as eight, Party officials in each provincial administration.

On the regional level, we find much the same picture. Almost invariably -- and without any exception in the case of the senior Party men -- these Communists were at least members, and more often chairmen or vice-chairmen, on the Central-South China Military and Political Committee (Central-South China M.P.C.) and the Central-South China Administrative Committee (Central-South China A.C.). We also find two commanders of the Central-South China Military District and two 4th Army Field Army officials among this group.

FORMER KUOMINTANG OFFICIALS

A second group of key men -- the former Kuomintang officials -- hold administrative positions just about equal, proportionately, in both quantity and function, to those of the Communists, with the important omission of Communist Party membership.

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The six ex-Kuomintang men mentioned above average almost four positions each, and these include ten top-level national positions. In addition to these six men, the three other known former Kuomintang officials are included in the analysis of this group, in order to give a clearer picture of the roles such men have played in the government since they joined it in 1949. 647.

Five of the Kuomintang men -- Ch'en Ming-shu, Lu Han, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Li Ming-hao, and T'ang Sheng-chih -- had military backgrounds. The other four were primarily administrators: Chang Nan-hsien, Li Jen-jen, Ch'en Tzu-sheng, and Ch'eng Hsing-ling. Seven of these men have some explicit record in their Kuomintang careers of participation in factional struggles, sporadic revolt, temporary imprisonment or exile, or personal animosity against the main Kuomintang leadership. Despite such records, five of the nine men had been members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

The importance of the first positions which the Kuomintang men held after they joined the Communists indicates the degree to which men of administrative experience were needed. In 1949-50, Kuomintang men held a total of twenty-nine positions: delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. (6); National Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C. (3); member of the Central People's Government Council (4); member of the Central-South China M.P.C. (8); vice-chairman, provincial government (4); member,

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provincial government (2); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1); and advisor to a provincial Military Control Committee (1).

Although they no longer hold as many positions; the former Kuomintang officials still occupy key posts in the Communist administration. We find among them five deputy-governors, one member of a Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., four members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., three members of the National Defense Council, three members of the Standing Committee of the First NPC, and eight delegates of the First NPC.

The actual power value of these positions must be assessed in the light of the fact that none of these men holds known Communist Party membership -- though there is always the possibility that one or another may have served as an enemy agent in Nationalist ranks. In any case, since they are outnumbered more than two to one by Party members on top levels, it is fairly certain that their functions are purely administrative rather than policy-making. In time they may well be succeeded by Party men as such replacements are trained. On the other hand, as long as Formosa remains independent of the Communists, the Peking government may keep certain former Kuomintang men in important positions in order to imply that compromise or consolidation is possible.

LEADERS NEXT IN LINE

The five remaining officials in the category

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of top officials cannot be classified on the basis of background or unity of function. They include one president of a People's High Court (Ts'ao Po-wen), two members of Provincial People's Governments (Li Ti'en-yu and Wang Shu-sheng), and two deputy-governors (T'an Ying-chi and Lu Shao-wu). None of them is noted as a Party official, but they appear to have more status than the others of their administrative groups, not only because of their additional positions but also because these positions are among those held, in the past or at present, by the senior leaders: commanders of military districts, National and Provincial Committee members of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and one director of the department of public safety -- a position indicating Party reliability. It seems safe to assume then, that if these men cannot yet be considered to hold senior status, they are at least high among those next in line.

When we consider the various incumbents according to the positions they hold on the regional level, we learn something of the significance of the positions in themselves and of the type of men who occupy them.

GOVERNORS

Our study includes the governors of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Honan Provincial People's governments. One of these men, Shao Shih-p'ing, has been a Communist leader since 1927; two governors were directors in Border Region governments; the fourth, T'ao Chu, has been known to us only since 1949.

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The careers of the two former Border Region officials -- Wu Chih-p'u of Honan Province and Liu Tzu-hou of Hupeh Province -- have some similarities. Both were first vice-chairmen and, later, chairmen of the governments of their provinces. Liu was a member of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C.; Wu was a delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. Liu is now deputy secretary of the Hupeh Provincial Committee of the Communist Party; Wu's present Party position is not known -- he is noted only as a delegate to the First NPC.

Shao Shih-p'ing, the governor of the Kiangsi Provincial People's Government, was a guerrilla organizer from 1927 to 1937, when he became associated with the Shansi, Hopei, and Chahar Anti-Japan University. He became president of this university before leaving it, in 1944, to join the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. He later became chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial People's Government and a member of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C. In addition to being governor, he is also a delegate to the First NPC. His exact Party status is not known.

T'ao Chu, the governor of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government, is the only one of the four who did not proceed to his position via the chairmanship, although he was, for a time in 1954, vice-chairman. Other than this we have only a few facts about his past career. His first known positions (in 1949) were as director of the Department

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of Political Affairs of the Central-South China Military District and of the 4th Field Army, and as political commissar of the Kwangtung Province Military District. Except for his membership on the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., the rest of the data on T'ao are current: in conjunction with his governorship, he also occupied the posts of chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and acting secretary of the South China Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC.

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We find, then, two types of governor: trusted Communist leaders with relatively long records of loyal service, and the Communist official whose multiple positions and high-ranking Party status indicate top level authority in the administrative structure. Keeping in mind our earlier conclusion that a long service record alone does not insure real seniority in terms of power, nevertheless we can see -- as we might expect -- that the governorship is an important instrument for insuring local Party control, and that the men in this position will represent the real source of authority in the government.

CHAIRMEN, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

Only one man is noted as chairman of a Provincial People's Government: Wei Kuo-ch'ing, of Kwangsi. All that is known of his past career is that in 1949 he was chairman of the Fu-chou (Foochow) Military Control Committee, and from 1950 to 1954,

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vice-political commissar of the Fukien Province Military District. His present multiple posts, however, rank him with the top group of leaders. He is a delegate and a member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC, vice-director of the Committee on Nationalities Affairs of the State Council, member of the National Defense Council, and member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. Although his Party status is not known, it may be assumed to be significant on two counts: the nature and number of his posts in the administration, and the nature of the post of chairman itself.

Former chairmen are, with one exception, Party men with senior status. The exception is Ch'eng Ch'ine, a Nationalist leader of long standing who was a candidate for the vice-presidency in the last Kuomintang election on the Mainland, is now the highest ranking of all the ex-Kuomintang men noted in this survey. The nine other former chairmen have all proceeded to positions of considerable importance. We find among them, as noted above, three of the four governors. We also find three members of the Central Committee of the CPC and two veteran Communists whose exact present Party rank is not known; all five are members of the National Defense Council. The ninth man is Hsing Chao-t'ang, former chairman of the Ninghsia Provincial People's Government, who is at present deputy governor of the Honan Provincial People's Government and delegate from Kansu Province to the First NPC.

We may conclude that the chairmanship, like the governorship, is under tight Party control, and

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has been reserved for men of noteworthy dependability or competence. The only exception -- Ch'eng Ch'ien - serves to emphasize this point, since he is exceptional among the group of ex-Kuomintang officials, and is the only one to hold the rank of chairman. 647 • 635

VICE-CHAIRMEN, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

When we examine the position of vice-chairman, we find that twenty men out of the seventy-nine have held the position of vice-chairman of a Provincial People's Government. Obviously some of these have gone on up the ladder; we have already mentioned three governors who are former vice-chairmen. In addition, we find five ranking Party members who have held this post and are now members of the senior group of leaders. Four of the Kuomintang men are former vice-chairmen, but they are not among those of their group who hold the most important positions. They are deputy-governors; one is also a member of the National Defense Council and of a Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and one is on the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.; otherwise they do not hold top-level posts.

The remaining eight former vice-chairmen are all deputy-governors. Five hold this position only, while the other three are also delegates to the First NPC. Only a small amount of background information indicating previous training or experience is available to us: three were members of the Central-

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South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C.: two are former members of Provincial People's Governments: one is a former Border Region official; one is a Communist Party Provincial Committee member; and two others are unknown.

DEPUTY-GOVERNORS

Forth-one men are deputy-governors. Thirteen have been considered in detail above -- the six Party officials, the two Border Region members, the five former Kuomintang men. It is worth noting again that in all of these groups, the men who hold the post of deputy-governor also hold, on the whole, other positins less important than those held by their associates in the same groups. Despite their similarity in background to the others, they do not have as many positions, nor do their positions include as many key posts.

We have no information about eleven of the remaining twenty-eight deputy-governors beyond the statement of their present position. On the basis of the available data about the others, we find six posts which many of them have held or now hold: member, Provincial People's Government (10); vice-chairman (7, not including the Party official discussed above); membership on the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C. (7); director, department of public safety (4); Provincial Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C. (2); and delegate, First NPC (9). Only two of these men hold more than two positions; they have already been studied. None of the others has an obviously

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significant combination of jobs or, as far as we can tell from the data, a background of particular meaning.

In connection with our study of the position of deputy-governor, it should be said that only three members of the Democratic Leagure noted among the entire seventy-nine men are deputy-governors. They are also delegates to the First NPC, and two are past members of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., but they hold no other positions on either regional or national levels.

MEMBERS, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

Ten men are identified as members of Provincial People's Governments. Each also holds another position of significance: four Presidents of People's High Courts, five commanders of military districts, and one NDYC Provincial Committee member.

Three of these men have already been mentioned because they hold three or more jobs each: Ts'ao Po-wen, president of the Hunan People's High Court; and Li T'ien-yu and Wang Shu-sheng, both commanders of military districts.

Except that three of the other commanders of military districts are past members of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., and one of them is a delegate to the First NPC, none of these ten members holds any other post.

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We have minimal data especially for the presidents of People's High Courts. Except for Ts'ao Po-wen, discussed above, all that we know of the others is that four are members of Provincial People's Governments, and for the other two on our list, we have no information at all. 647 635

NEW DEMOCRATIC YOUTH CORPS OFFICIALS

Our last category concerns five NDYC members. Two have already been noted because of their posts as Central Committee member and provincial government member, respectively. The other three are all former members of the People's Control Committee of their provinces (Kiangsi, Hunan, and Honan), but now hold no other positions except on the NDYC. The fifth man, Huang Huan-ch'iu, is noted only as being secretary of the South China Committee of the NDYC. 647

CONCLUSION

Investigations of this sort suffer, as yet, from a lack of detailed information not only of many key individuals in higher categories of Party and government, but more especially of second- and third-level men on the way up. We can conclude without meaningful qualification that the central leadership of the Communist Party of China keeps tight control of decisions in regional and provincial governmental administrations, but more revealing analyses of elite patterns will depend upon the continued collection of biographical detail on every important echelon and the expansion of each man's dossier to include material about his origins, social and economic background, education, and earliest advances on the latter to power.